Democracy Center - The structure of scientific revolutions: The theory of collective choice

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Research and advice on methods of voting and election

In the theory of collective choice, which among other things is studied in economics, political science, game theory, philosophy (logic) and sociology, some six news have been presented since 1970, i.e.

1)   introduction of intensity in voting
2)   Arrow's dissociation from the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives in voting
3)   introduction of the concept choice meaning for evaluating voting procedures
4)   rejection, with regard to economic theory of demand, of the idea of irrelevant alternatives as a condition for voting procedures
5)   dealing with large issues, such as budgets, incorporated in fund voting
6)   introduction of two paradox-free voting procedures.

It will be explained how these news came into existence, how they were approved without delay by the most capable scientists (1 and 3-6) and how the academic world in general has reacted. The statement presented resembles how Thomas Kuhn in 1962 explained the development of physics in The structure of scientific revolutions.

Recent publications in this field with regard to the above-mentioned news are dealt with in a special place on ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Bjoern_Stefansson/contributions

We point out two treatments there:

Collective choice and social welfare. Expanded edition. Amartya K. Sen. Penguin Books 2017. A discussion in the view of the procedures sequential choice and fund voting

and

The Arrow impossibility theorem. Eric Masking and Amartya Sen with Kenneth J. Arrow, Parthia Gupta, Peasant K. Patagonian and Joseph E. Stieglitz. (Kenneth J. Arrow lecture series) Columbia University Press, 2014. A discussion

Presented on a seminar in Reykjavik Academy December 7, 2017

[translated from the Icelandic]