The aim of proportional representation is that the views of the voters will be expressed in their relative strengths by the representatives. If 40% of the voters have views that shape the policy of the L party and vote for candidates from the L list, they should return 40% of the representatives. The result does not necessarily reflect the relative strength of their views. The situation after the election might be that the 60% who voted for something else will join together to prevent the L group from having any influence. Some may find consolation in the hope that this will change in the next election.
With fund voting, no single group can remain in control for a long time. If anyone tried this, they would gradually spend their fund of votes, while the others, who thus fell under their domination, would get into a position in which they could decide the outcome of the ballots. No experience is needed to come to this conclusion. Furthermore, and more importantly, it has been shown by experience, albeit not extensive, that in fund voting, factions do not band together. If, at the beginning of an issue, two opposing views appear, both factions will consider it an advantage to formulate more alternatives, which will gradually grow ever more remote from what people prefer most. They will do this in the hope that, despite their zeal, their opponents might consider, as a reserve measure, staking votes on an alternative that they are not altogether happy with, and also, for safety’s sake, they themselves will stake a few votes on it as well. The method encourages people to formulate and propose more alternatives.
The consequences of fund voting are that voters enjoy their proportional rights in the long run. When fund voting has become established, it will change the importance of proportional representation to ensure relative distribution of the voters’ influence. It is a simple matter to distinguish between the fact that a representative has been elected and the number of votes he receives in his fund. The purpose of electing representatives using fund voting is to make sure that views which enjoy a certain amount of support will be heard and influence the course of events. For this to happen, it does not matter much whether four or five speakers advocate a certain viewpoint at a meeting; this is different from the present situation, in which both those in the majority and those who remain in a powerless minority depend on whether a party has four or five representatives and on who belongs to the ineffectual minority.
Only experience will show how frequently there is reason to use fund voting to settle issues. Under the present situation, votes are frequently taken simply to confirm the result of an agreement. When people know that an issue can be put to a fund vote, the reasons for sounding out opinion will change and an increase in alternatives will become the natural result.
To ensure that a proposal made by the minority of the representatives will not be excluded from fund voting, a provision can be made stating how many (or few) representatives are needed to call for a fund vote on an issue.
Another question is who should exercise fund votes, e.g., only representatives who would then receive votes into their funds in relation to the votes by which they were elected, or might others be allowed to exercise a vote.
In this connection, whether the result of a fund vote is binding or not is a rather important consideration. If it is not binding, then those who decide the issue must produce arguments in support of their view, whether they approve the result or not.